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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
be such a deposit has not been decided by the Supreme
Court although such a holding seems correct and equit-
able.' May a bank safely ignore this possibility and fail to
report death in all cases of joint deposits by husband and
wife? The exemption from taxation seems to include all
such deposits and the exemption from reporting death
should certainly be equally extensive. Prudence would
seem to dictate, however, that the depository report death
in cases of deposits by husband and wife unless the facts
are such that the deposit cannot be other than a tenancy
by the entirety. Looking from the other angle, prudence
would dictate the making of the report where either the
husband or wife had a right to withdraw funds from the
deposit by separate checks unsigned by the other spouse
for it is this right that makes it questionable that the
deposit is a tenancy by the entirety.
4
Harold S. Irwin
THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUENT CRIMES ON
INDICTMENT, VERDICT AND JUDGMENT
IN CRIMINAL CASES
The recent case of Dunn v. The United States decided
on January 11, 1932, and reported in 52 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189,
76 Lawyer's Ed. 249, 284 U. S.-is of peculiar interest. It
is the last case for which justice Holmes wrote the
opinion. For the next day after handing down this de-
cision Justice Holmes resigned from the highest court in
the United States to retire to private life. This case is
not one of grave economic interest requiring a liberal dis-
senting opinion for which Justice Holmes was noted but
a common everyday liquor case. In this case the defend-
ant, Dunn, was indicted on three counts: first, for main-
taining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a speci-
fied place intoxicating liquor, second for unlawful posses-
sion of such liquor, and third for unlawful sale of such
834 Dickinson Law Review 156 et seq. (March, 1930).
'Idem.
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liquor. The jury acquitted him on the second and third
counts but convicted him on the first. The defendant ap-
pealed on the ground that the verdict on the second and
third counts was inconsistent with that upon the first and
that he should be discharged. Justice Holmes in his
opinion said:
"Consistency in a verdict is not necessary. Each
count in an indictment is regarded as if it were a separate
indictment. If separate indictments had been presented
against the defendant for possession and for maintaining
a nuisance, and had been tried separately the same evidence
being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could
not be pleaded as res adjudicata of the other. Where of-
fenses are separately charged in counts of a single indict-
ment, the same rule must hold."
The chief point of interest in this case, however, is the
problem that arises when an act or series of acts constitute
two or more crimes. Peculiar situations result in the in-
dictment, verdict and judgment as the crimes differ in
degree. This case presents the situation in which crimes
are of the same degree. The decision of the majority of
the court represents the general rule as to this question.
The indictment may charge in different counts, different
offenses covered by the same transaction in all the various
ways necessary to meet the possible phases of evidence
that may appear at the trial.' Each count in the indict-
ment, in Pennsylvania, is regarded as if it were a separate
indictment, and therefore consistency in the verdict is not
necessary.2 The fact that the acquittal on one count, as in
the Dunn case, negatives the commission of the crimes
charged in- other counts will not prevent judgment on the
verdict of guilty on another count. This seems illogical as
was contended by the dissenting judge, Justice Butler, but
it is in keeping with the rule that each count is regarded
as a separate indictment, and the fact that the jury arrives
'Henwood v. Corn., 52 Pa. 424 (1866).
2Com. v. Donato, 87 Pa. Super. Ct. 285 (1926); Com. v. Strauss, 89
Pa. Super. Ct. 82 (1926); Mills v. Corn., 13 Pa. 634 (1850); Com. v,
Spink, 137 Pa. 255 (1890).
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at such an inconsistent finding cannot be questioned. A
verdict which specifically states a finding of guilty on the
first count without any findings at all on the other counts
is equivalent to a finding of not guilty on the other counts
of the indictment.' But as will be shown later an acquit-
tal on one count will not operate as an acquittal on the
other counts when those others are not specifically men-
tioned.
It was the general rule at common law and is -now
the general practice that when an indictment charges an
offense which includes within it another lesser offense, or
one of lower degree, the defendant, tho acquitted of the
higher offense may be convicted of the lesser.' The indict-
ment may contain but one count charging the major of-
fense only but the defendant may be convicted on that in-
dictment for the constituent offense. For example, on an
indictment for murder, the defendant may be convicted of
voluntary manslaughter even tho it was not specifically
charged.5 This statement indicates that the law implies
that the lesser crime is included in the higher crime for
which the accused is specifically charged, and the indict-
ment must contain allegations essential to constitute a
charge of the lesser. To test the question whether an in-
dictment for an offense includes within it a lesser offense,
it has been said that when the offenses are of the same
general character, the indictment for the one offense must
contain all the essential elements of the other or the prose-
cution for the latter cannot be maintained.6
Where one count charges a greater offense, other
counts may charge lesser offenses included therein for even
without special alleging, the defendant may be convicted
of a constituent offense included within the one for which
3Com. v. Curry, 285 Pa. 289, 132 A. 370 (1926); Garton v. Corn.,
22 Pa. 351 (1853).
'Com. v. Anagustov, 82 Pa. Super. Ct. 156, (1923); Hunter v.
Com., 79 Pa. 503 (1875); Harman v. Com. 12 S. & R. 69 (1824);
Dinkey v. Com., 17 Pa. 126 (1851).
5Gable v. Com., 7 S. & R. 423 (1821).
OCom. v. Shutte, 130 Pa. 272 (1889); Hunter v. Com., 79 Pa. 503
(1875).
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he was indicted. Where the two offenses are charged in
separate counts, if the defendant can make it appear that
the joinder will subject him to unreasonable difficulty or
embarrassment, the court has it in its power either to
quash the indictment or to compel the prosecutor to elect
on which count he will proceed.8
It is a rule that an acquittal or conviction on an indict-
ment for a minor offense is generally a bar to a subse-
quent indictment for the greater offense where the evi-
dence necessary to convict of the latter would have been
sufficient to sustain a conviction for the former.' The con-
verse is also true. An acquittal or conviction for a greater
offense is a bar to a subsequent indictment for the minor
offense included in the former whenever under the indict-
ment for the greater offense, the defendant could have
been convicted of the lesser.10
In summing up these cases coming within the general
rule, where distinct crimes set forth grow out of the same
transaction differing only in degree, only one penalty can
be imposed after conviction, and separate sentences for
each offense charged are void except that sentence per-
missible upon conviction of the more serious charge. 1
At the common law an exception was made to the
general rule stated above. Where the constituent crime
was a misdemeanor and the major offense was a felony, at
common law, the rule of merger was said to operate and
the lesser crime was absorbed in the greater. In such a
case, where the defendant was indicted for a felony he
could not be convicted of the constituent misdemeanor ;12
'Com. v. Shutte, 130 Pa. 272 (1889); Harman v. Com., 12 S. & R.
69 (1824); Com. v. Ashe, 293 Pa. 322 (1928).
8Slevick v. Com., 78 Pa. 460 (1875).
9 Dinkey v. Com., 17 Pa. 126 (1851); Com. v. Morgan, 9 Kulp 573
(1899); Com. v. Lloyd, 141 Pa. 28 (1891).
10Com. v. Neely, 2 Chester Co. Rep. 191 (1884); Com. v. Mc-
Evans, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 124 (1927); Com. v. Reed, 4 Lanc. Law Rev.
89.
"Com. v. Ashe, 293 Pa. 322 (1928); Johnston v. Com., 185 Pa. 54
(1898); Com. v. Bailey, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 581 (1927); Com. v. Heston,
292 Pa. 501 (1928).
2Com. v. Gable, 7 S. & R_ 423 (1821)
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or where upon indictment for the misdemeanor, the felony
is proved the defendant had to be acquitted of the mis-
demeanor because it merged in the felony.13 The reason
for this at common law was that on trial for a felony the
defendant was denied certain privileges such as the priv-
ilege of counsel, right to a copy of the indictment, and re-
striction of the right to challenge. To preserve the dis-
tinction between felonies and misdemeanors, the rule of
merger was adopted, for if a man was allowed to be con-
victed of a misdemeanor on an indictment for a felony, or
for a felony on indictment for misdemeanor, the distinc-
tion would disappear.
14
'The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors
has been abolished and the reasonable ground for the
rule of merger has disappeared and so today by
statute in Pennsylvanian that rule no longer exists.
By Section 51 of the Act of 1860 P.L. 427, 19 Purdon 831,
where the defendant is indicted for a misdemeanor and
the evidence discloses a felony, the defendant cannot be
acquitted of the misdemeanor, as he was entitled under the
common law, but cannot be convicted oF the felony unless
the court discharges the jury and directs an indictment for
the felony. The effect of this act is to abolish merger in
so far as it existed in an indictment for a misdemeanor
where the facts prove a felony. 15 By a liberal construction
of this section of the Act and also of Section 50, merger has
been abolished also where the defendant is indicted for a
felony and the facts prove a constituent misdemeanor. 6
So today in Pennsylvania, a defendant, in an indictment
for a felony may be convicted of a constituent misdemeanor
included therein. At common law, counts for misdemeanors
and felonies could not be joined in the same indictment but
this rule has also been abolished and today counts for fel-
18Com. v. Parr, 5 W. & S. 345 (1843).
14Wharton's Criminal Law, 9th Edition, Vol. I, Page 41.
15Com. v. Robinson, 85 Pa. Super. Ct. 424 (1925).
16Com. v. Anagustov, 82 Pa. Super. Ct. 156 (1923); Hunter v.
Com., 79 Pa. 503 (1875); Com. v. Sobel, 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 525 (1928).
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onies and misdemeanors can be joined in one indictment."
In the opinion of the writer, merger does exist even
today in homicide cases where on an indictment for murder
the evidence discloses guilt of involuntary manslaughter.
It has been consistently held and appears well settled that
on an indictment for murder, the defendant cannot be con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter even where the facts
prove a case of involuntary manslaughter.18 The courts
base their decision now on a. long line of cases beginning
with Corn. v. Gable19 and including Walters v. Corn.20 In the
case of Corn. v. Gable the court specifically held that since
the Act of 1794 expressly made involuntary manslaughter
a misdemeanor there could be no conviction of that crime
on an indictment of murder because there could be no con-
viction of a misdemeanor on an indictment for a felony
by reason of the common law rule of merger. Walters v.
Corn., the case most cited for this proposition, decided after
the Act of 1860, based its decision on the same grounds and
cited the case of Corn. v. Gable. The court expressly gives
as its reason the fact that a misdemeanor cannot be joined
with a count for a felony because of the rule of merger.
These two cases are the cases relied upon by later decisions
on this question which has become so well settled* that the
courts have forgotten or overlooked the real reason-the
rule of merger. So today, there is no reason why, on an
indictment for murder, where the evidence discloses the de-
fendant's guilt of involuntary manslaughter, that the de-
fendant should not be convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter. The general rule, that upon an indictment for
a greater offense whether it be a felony or misdemeanor,
the defendant may be convicted of the lesser offense in-
cluded therein, should apply.
Robert W. Anthony.
17Hunter v. Com., 79 Pa. 503 (1875); Com. v. Shutte, 130 Pa, 272
(1889).
IsCom. v. Greevy, 271 Pa. 95 (1921).
'9Com. v. Gable, 7 S. & R. 423 (1821).
20Walters v. Com., 44 Pa. 135 (1862).
